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I.

NATURE OF TIIE CASE
Petition by Intervenors Frank Tuckey and Mary Tuckey
to gain custody of their grandchildren Larry Dean Tuckey,
Jr., and Christopher Lee Tuckey.
II.

DI SP OS ITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Petition denied on April 24, 1980.

Motion for new

trial or in the alternative to open judgment and take additional
testimony denied on June 4, 1980.
III.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
A reversal of the lower court's decision and entry of
an order of the Supreme Court granting custody of the minor
children to Intervenors.

IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The underlying action is one for divorce brought by
Plaintiff Larry Dean Tuckey against Debra A. Tuckey.

Plaintiff

and Defendant were and are parents of two (2) children, to wit,
Larry Dean Tuckey, Jr., a male, born March 22, 1975 and Christopher
Lee Tuckey, a make, born July 30, 1976.

Permanent care, custody

and control of the said minor children was vested in Defendant
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Debra A. Tuckey under the terms of the original Decree of Divorce.
The petition of Frank Tuckey and Mary Tuckey to intervene in
this matter was granted on the 15th day of February, ·1979, as
was Intervenors' Motion for Temporary custody of the minor children
pending a final resolution of the issue of permanent custody.
In connection with the granting of the two motions as set forth
above, the Court ordered that a family evaluation be conducted
prior to the consideration of permanent custody by the Court.
An evaluation of Intervenors was performed on August 30, 1979

by Denise Taft pursuant to the Court's order, wherein it was
recommended that the minor children remain under the permanent
care, custody and control of Intervenors.

Ms. Taft was unable

to locate the natural mother, Debra A. Tuckey, to perform any
evaluation of her at that time.

The trial, originally set for

January 28, 1980, was continued at the behest of Defendant until
February 29, 1980.

During the approximately one year period from

February of 1979 through February of 1980, the minor children
resided with Intervenors while Defendant lived in various places,
including Randolf, Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah and La Pointe,
Utah.

During the year the minor children lived with their grand-

parents they had limited contact with their natural mother by
telephone and by personal contact.

During the time the minor

children stayed with Intervenors, they were well taken care of,
received a great deal of love as well as discipline and enjoyed
the structured environment.

Intervenors made substantial economic
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outlays for the benefit of the minor children and spent a great
deal of time with the children in family-related activities.
Intervenors received no support or help of any kind from either
the father of the minor children or the mother, Defendant Debra
A. Tuckey, although Intervenors did receive a small amount of
help from the State of Utah.
Just prior to the trial in this matter, on February 26,
1980, Ms. Taft of the Department of Social Services did a
followup evaluation of Intervenors as well as an evaluation of
Defendant Debra A. Tuckey as this Court had previously ordered.
Ms. Taft reiterated in the report on this second evaluation what
she had provided in the earlier one, to wit:

that the interests

of the minor children would be best served by allowing them
to remain under the permanent care, custody and control of Intervenors.
There was some confusion prior to the trial on the merits
of this matter as to the actual standard to be applied by the Court
to the facts.

Counsel for Intervenors argued that the "best interests

of the minor children" should be the controlling factor whereas
counsel for Defendant Debra A. Tuckey argued that to prevail,
Intervenors would be required to prove Defendant unfit.

After a

trial on the merits, the Court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
presiding, denied Intervenors' petition and by order dated April
24, 1980 awarded full care, custody and control of the minor
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children of the parties to Defendant Debra A. Tuckey, the children's
natural mother.

v.
ARGUMENT
1.

The Trial Court Utilized An Incorrect Standard in

Deciding This Matter and Must Therefore, be Reversed.
The approach taken by various courts to the issue of contested custody between a natural parent and a grandparent may be
divided into two specific categories, i.e., the "parental right"
doctrine and the "best interests of the child".

The former re-

quires a showing on the part of the moving party that the natural
parent is unfit or that other extraordinary circumstances exist
which overcome the presumption that a natural parent is entitled
to custody over the grandparent.

In the latter case the child's

welfare and best interests are presumed to be more important than
any parental right.

See, generally, 29 ALR 3d 366, 390-395.

It

is Intervenors' contention that the Court here should have applied
the "best interests" doctrine in accordance with Utah law and
most jurisdictions and by failing so to do connnitted reversible
error.
A general survey of cases on this particular point reveals
that the modern tendency is toward the "best interests" of the child
and away from the "parental right" approach.

As between parents
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vying for custody of a child, there can be little argument that
the "best interest" of the child is the appropriate standard
in most, if not all jurisdictions.

The apparent jusiification

for arguing that a different standard should apply when a nonparent is seeking custody from a natural parent stems of course
from a "natural law" theory that there is some innate right on
the part of the natural parent to the society of the child during
the child's minority.

However, the following survey will reflect

that the courts are quite consistent in applying the "best interests"
approach in cases of this kind:
a.

Florida.

In the the case of Brandon v. Faulk, 326

So.2d 76 (Fla., 1976), the Court upheld the trial Court's decision
to vest custody of a nine year old girl in the paternal grandparents and in so doing stated at 80:
. in such [custody] situations the best
interest of the minor child is of paramount
consideration and is the guiding pole star.
b.

Nebraska.

Another state which has recently rejected

the application of the "parental right" doctrine is the State
of Nebraska.

In the case of State v. Blanco, 128 NW2d 615

(Neb., 1964) the Court stated at 619:

d

The courts may not properly deprive a parent
of the custody of a minor child unless it is
affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit
to perform the duties imposed by the relationship, or has forefeited that right.
-5-
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In the Blanco case the Court overturned the lower
decision granting custody of the child to the natural mother,
and gave custody of the child to the grandmother under the theory
that the natural mother was not fit and proper and that therefore
she had forefeited her right to custody of the child.

In any

event, this approach was not utilized in the later cases of
Contreras v. Alsidez, 265 NW2d 452 (Neb., 1978) wherein the
Court recognized the "best interest" test as superior to the
rights of any parties, including the natural parents, although
the latter were, of course, to be considered.
c.

Hinnesota.

In the case of Hemman v. Markson, 244

NW 687 (Minn., 1932) although the court sustained a change of
custody of a twelve year old boy from the maternal grandparents
to the mother, the Court recognized the best interest standard
at 687:
The superior right of a parent to the custody
of a child is recognized by the law; but this
right yields to the best interests of the
child.
That standard was followed in the later case of Wallin v.
Wallin, 187 NW2d 687 (Minn., 1971) wherein the Court, on an
inconclusive evidentiary record, remanded a case wherein a
natural mother's petition to wrest custody of a six year old
girl from the maternal grandparents was denied by the trial court.
This action was explained at 630 as follows:
The principle that the custody of young chilren
is ordinarily best vested in the mother, vital
-6-
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and established as it may be, is distinctly
subordinate to the controlling principle
that the overriding consideration in custody
proceedings is the child's welfare.
d.

Oklahoma.

In ex parte Walla cs, 241 P. 2d 192 (Okla.,

1952) the maternal grandmother sought custody of a thirteen year
old girl.

At trial, neither the grandmother nor the natural

mother was shovm to be unfit.

The Court indicated its obligation

to be to review the whole record and determine which custody
was in the best interest of the minor child under all the
facts and circumstances shown, and indicated at 193 as follows:
She [the natural mother] has not by abandonment
or by any improper conduct on her part or by
contract surrendered the right to its control
and custody to petitioner. In these circumstances
the law •vill presur.ie that she is a fit and proper
person to have its care and custody and that the
best interest of the child require that custody
be awarded her and this presumption will prevail
until overcome by
clear and convincing evidence
showing that its best interest requires that
custody be placed elsewhere.
e.

Pennsylvania.

In the relative early case of In Re

Beaver's Estate, 182 A. 744 (Penn., 1936) a six year old girl who
had lived for a time with her paternal grandparents was returned
to the custody of her mother.

The Court agreed at 745 with the

trial court's opinion:
. . . that the proper criteria in a case of
this nature is the best interest and permanent
wellbeing of the child.

-7-
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In Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 281 A.2d 729 (Penn., 1971)
the Court overturned a lower court's decision taking custody of
boys aged ten and eleven from the maternal grandparents and
giving them to the natural mother.

The Court at 730 specifically

did not utilize the "parental right" approach and did not dwell
upon the alleged -unfitness of the natural mother, who was
unconventional in lifestyle and morality, but at 730 recognized
the following standard:
Unless compelling reasons appear, it will be
deemed that the best interests of children
of tender years require that they be connnitted
to the care and custody of their mother.
Thus, although the Court did require a showing of compelling
reasons, the primary standard of the best interests of the children
was recognized over the presumption in favor of the natural parent.
f.

Texas.

In the case of In Re Benfield, 46 8 SW2d 156

(Tex., 1971) the Court recognized "best interests" as the standard
in an adoption proceeding and followed this standard in the case

of Interest of Barrera, 531 SW2d 908 (I'..:x., 1975)

In the Barrera

case, upon the death of the father, the maternal grandparents were
named by the trial court as managing conservators under Texas
law of two minor children, ages nine and seven, and the natural
mother was named only temporary possessory conservator.
appealed this decision, which was affirmed on appeal.

The mother
The Court

in this regard at 910 stated:
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Although there is a presumption that a
surviving parent is the most suitable person
to have custody of minor children, the controlling consideration is the best interests
of the children . . . Since the welfare of
children is the court's paramount concern
and guiding consideration in any contest
over the right to custody, this concern
and consideration will prevail over any
asserted claim of legal right in a party to
the controversy.
It is also important to note that in the Barrera case, the
trial court had even disregarded a Texas statute giving the
surviving natural parent entitlement to appointment of guardian
of the child's estate.
The foregoing are representative of holdings in the following jurisdictions and cases:

Graves v. Graves, 288 So2d 142

(Ala., 1973); Wallace v. Moss, 174 SE2d 197, (Georgia, 1970);
Osman v. Osman, 264 NE2d 263 (Ill., 1970); Perdue v. Perdue,
257 NE2d 927 (Indiana, 1970); Wood v. Beard, 280 So.2d 567
(La., 1973); Elm v. Key, 489 P.2d 104 (Wyo., 1971); Carrere v.
Prunty, 133 NW2d 692 (Iowa, 1954).
At least two cases directly bearing on the issue before this
Court have been decided in the jurisdiction of Utah.

In the

case of Walton v. Coffman, 169 P.2d 97 (1946), the natural
mother by a writ of habeas corpus sought to recover custody of
two minor children from the maternal grandparents.

The Court

at 100 observed as follows:

-9-
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All of our decisions recognize the general
rule that the welfare of the child is
controlling.
The Court then engaged in a rather detailed resume of previous
cases that had brought this issue before the Court including
Harrison v. Harker, 142 P. 716; Jones v. Moore, 213 P. 191;
Jensen v. Earley, 228 P. 217; and Sherry v. Doyle, 249 P.250,
from which the Court at 102 to 103 distilled the following rule:
We conclude that the determining consideration
in cases of this kind is: What will be for the
best interest and welfare of the child? That
in determining this question there is a presumption that it will be for the best interest
and welfare of the child to be reared under
the care, custody and control of the natural
parent; that this presumption is not overcome unless from all of the evidence the
trier of the facts is satisfied that the welfare of the child requires that it be awarded
to someone other than its natural parent.
Thus, the ultimate burden of proof on this
question is always in favor of the parent
and against the other person.

However, this presumption is one of fact
and not of law, and may be overcome by any
competent evidence which is sufficient to
satisfy a reasonable mind thereon.
We are satisfied that this is the rule which
has been followed in this Court in all our
cases except Jensen v. Earley, supra. To the
extent that Jensen v. Earley holds to the contrary it is expressly overruled. This rule
is sustained by the great weight of authority
in this country and we think by the better
reasoning.
-10-
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The Court in the subsequent case of Hardcastle v. Hardcastle,
221 P.2d 883 (Utah, 1950) recognized the rule as set forth in
the Coffman case as the applicable rule, but at 887 found that
it was not applicable under the facts of the Hardcastle case.
In accord with Coffman are the following:

Farmer v.

Christensen, 183 P.328 (Utah, 1919); 209 P.340 (Utah, 1922);
Wallick v. Vance, 289 P.103 (Utah, 1930); and Flora v. Flora
29 P.2d 498 (Utah, 1934).
Thus, the law of the State of Utah as well as the law
of the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions of the United States,
is that the best interest and welfare of a minor child will be
the controlling factor in determining custody between a natural
parent and a grandparent, and although there may be a presumption in favor of the natural parent and this presumption has
been recognized in virtually all of the literature cited above,
that presumption, at least in the State of Utah, is a presumption
of fact which may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.

Nowhere in Utah decisions cited above or in

any of the authorities that have been cited by Intervenors in
support of this petition, is there found a standard which requires that Intervenors prove the natural mother unfit.

To

do so requires that Intervenors overcome a virtually insurmountable
burden and to impose such a.burden on lntervenors is under the
great weight of authority incorrect and must constitute reversible
error.
-11-
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2.

Certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Entered by the Court are not Supported by the Evidence.
a.

Finding of Fact No. 6.

(R, 94) After a hearing on

objections of Intervenors to the proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law submitted by counsel for Defendant Debra
A. Tuckey, counsel for Intervenors submitted Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

As to Finding of Fact No. 6, the Court

crossed out the following proposed Finding of Fact in its
entirety:
A home study was performed by Denise Taft,
a social service worker, prior to August
30, 1979 wherein Ms. Taft recorra:nended that
permanent. custody of the two (2) minor
children be vested in Intervenors.
In place of the foregoing Finding of Fact the Court
substituted "Plaintiff is not seeking custody of the children
at this time" and added, apparently referring to the second
portion, the following:
The Court makes no finding thereon, as there
was no evaluation made of Defendant Debra
A. Tuckey.
In the first place, Ms. Taft testified under oath that
she was assigned by the Department of Family Services to perform
a home study on Intervenors on approximately August l, 1979
(R, 168, line 24 - R, 169, line 8) and further testified that
although reasonable efforts were made to find Debra A. Tuckey,
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she was not able to do so and therefore Ms. Taft did not
evaluate Defendant Debra A. Tuckey at that time.
line 10-17)

(R, 169,

In any event, the home study was finally

accomplished, and the difference between how the children acted
on August 1, 1979 and in February, 1980 when the home study
and evaluation of Debra A. Tuckey was performed was remarkable
to Ms. Taft.

(R, 172, lines 1-13)

She stated

(R, 172,

lines 10-13) :
They seemed not threatened and much more
relaxed and more secure in this interaction
than they had been the previous one.
The point of the matter is that Ms. Taft recommended as
a result of the home study performed in August, 1979 that the
children be allowed to remain with their grandparents, and
the followup study that was done wherein Ms. Taft was able to·
observe Defendant Debra A. Tuckey did not change that opinion.
If anything, the previous contact in August of 1980 should have
made Ms. Taft's testimony more valid and should

have been given

more weight by the Court inasmuch as Ms. Taft had more of an
opportunity to observe the grandparents and the children with
the grandparents than she otherwise would have had.

Furthermore,

the study performed in February of 1980 was nothing more than
an extension of the study previously commenced in August of 1979,

-13-
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and the Court should not have arbitrarily disregarded those
conclusions reached in August of 1979 for the mere reason that
the natural mother was not part of the evaluation.

Whether or

not the mother was a party to the investigation has nothing to
do with the observations that Ms. Taft made in the grandparents'
home and it is erroneous not to have considered the same.
b.

Finding of Fact No. 7. (R, 94) The Court crossed out of

proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 the following:
Wherein it was further recoilllllended that
Defendant not have permanent custody of
them.
In fact, the followup visit in February of 1980 did bear
the recommendation that Defendant, the natural mother of the
children, not have permanent custody of the children. (R, 179,
lines 14-19).

The point seems important and it appears that

the Court in this instance had moved from its position as a
dispassionate forum and has apparently specifically disregarded
certain evidence because it does not comport with its ovm
predilections as to where children should be placed in custody
battles.

While i t is within the Court's discretion to give or

not give certain weight or credibility to expert testimony,
nevertheless it cannot be within the Court's power to completely
disregard as a finding of fact a conclusion reached by an
employee of the Department of Social Services who became
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involved in the matter in the first place at the Court's own
order.
c.

Finding of Fact No. 9.

(R, 94) The Court added to

the proposed Finding of Fact that:
[t]he job market in Vernal appears to be
very good.
Debra A. Tuckey testified that her husband would "probably"
get a job Monday, (R, 125, line 20) but that it was not promised.
(R, 125, line 22)

A search of ta transcript has revealed no

other testimony relative to the job market in Vernal and
therefore there is no basis for the finding of fact as indicated
by the Court.

Further, Defendant Debra A. Tuckey (R, 126, line

11) testified that she was buying land from her mother, but made

no further indications in this regard can be found, indicating
no basis for such finding.
d.

Conclusion of Law No. 2.

(R, 95) By this interliniation

the Court has muddied the water as to the actual standard applied.
At the hearing of Intervenors' objections to the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and other motions before the Court,
counsel for Intervenors sought a clarification of the standard
utilized by the Court at trial:
MR. GUYON:

(R, 244, lines 1-11)

As long as it's clear that the Court
actually used the standard that I had
a burden to show that the mother was
·unfit. But that doesn't seem clear to
me, your honor.
-15-
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THE COURT:

It's less than clear from the cases,
but I thing that's what the cases are
saying.

MR. GUYON:

I would also argue, your Honor, that
the actual standard the Court is bound
to utilize is that of the best interests
of the children.

THE COURT:

As to that, I would clearly reject that.
I don't think that's consistent with
Utah law.

Thus, while the Court admitted in that hearing that it had
actually utilized the standard of requiring Intervenors to show
the mother unfit in order to prevail, the conclusion of law
as indicated by the Court reflects a different standard.
3.

The Clear Weight of Evidence in this Matter Supports

Intervenors' Position.
It is submitted that the testimony on record taken as
a whole, and the record itself, empower and even require this
Court, upon application of the correct standard, to find that
Intervenors should receive custody of the minor children of
the initial parties to this action.
In the first place, Defendant Debra A. Tuckey voluntarily
relinquished custody and control of the children to Intervenors.
The minute entry made on February 8, 1979 (R, 37) indicates
"No objection from the mother, Debra Tuckey."

As indicated in
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the subsequent order (R, 38) the Court heard Debra A. Tuckey's
sworn testimony relative to the issue of temporary custody
and granted the same to Intervenors.

In that same order (R, 39)

the Court ordered a custody evaluation, the result of which
Judge Rigtrup refused to make finding of fact (R, 94) as discussed
above.

It is true that Debra A. Tuckey moved the Court to set

aside the order (R, 42), but when that motion was denied (R, 49,
50) it is significant to note that Defendant did not have sufficient
interest to renotice the matter before the Honorable Dean Conder
as provided for in the order (R, 49).
The year following the February, 1979 hearing was indicative
of Defendant's lack of interest in her children as well as the
circumstances of their being with Intervenors:

Avis (the maternal

grandmother) had the children and allowed Intervenors to take
them (R, 136, lines 2-4, testimony of Intervenor Mary Tuckey).
No support, including money, clothing and toys, was
ever given to Intervenors by Defendant or members of Defendant's
family even though promises were made both by Defendant and
Defendant's mother.

(R, 136, lines 12-20, testimony of Intervenor

Mary Tuckey).
Contacts between the mother and the children were very
sparse, short telephone contacts having occurred on February 7th
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and 26th, 1979 (R, 148, lines 12, 13); March 4, 11, 22 and 26,
1979 (R, 148, lines 21; 22); April 8, 17, 27, 1979 (R, 148,
lines 1-3); and July 3, 1979 (R, 148, line 4).

Between July

3, 1979 and January 7, 1980 there was absolutely no telephone
contact between Defendant and her children (R, 149, line 5-9).
All the telephone contacts were short and Mary Tuckey testified
(R, 148, lines 15, 16) she would ask Defendant if Defendant
wanted to talk with her own children and in several cases
Defendant had not communicated wibh the boys during the telephone
contacts.

Defendant testified she lived in La Pointe, Utah

during this period (R, 195, lines 1-2) and that she had access
to her mother's phone (R, 199, lines 9-10).

Defendant's

testimony relative to the availability of a telephone is unclear
in view of her earlier statement (R, 196, lines 12-16) that
she had to travel miles to a pay telephone.
Relative to personal contacts, Mary Tuckey testified to
several such contacts between Debra and the children during the
year starting in February, 1979 (R, 149, line 12 to R, 153,
line 1).

Debra excused the infrequency of such contacts because

of lack of transportation (R, 195, line 17-21), but admitted
on cross-examination (R, 207, lines 1-11) that she came to
Salt Lake City "often" and "twice" without seeing the children.
Mary Tuckey's testimony (R, 155, line 10-18) that Defendant
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told her Defendant's mother wanted the children so they could
receive further welfare benefits was totally unrefuted by other
testimony.
Other unrefuted testimony of Mary Tuckey bears serious
consideration by this Court.

She described the children's un-

ruly behavior when first entering her home (R, 136, lines 3-6),
but indicates. also a close relationship with them (R, 136,
line 8).

Furthermore, the children received excellent care in

the form of clothing and medical health (R, 136, lines 10-11);
clothing (R, 136, line 10); and entertainment (R, 141, lines
9-23).

Intervenors even cashed in a life insurance policy

to pay back bills and buy the children a bed.

(R, 142, lines

2-8).
The testimony of Denise Taft, who was stipulated to as
to expert testimony (R, 168, line 14), was very much in favor
of Intervenors as custodians.

Ms. Taft met with Intervenors

in their home as well as in her office (R, 169, lines 4-8) and
made the following observations and came to the following
conclusions in their regard:
They were providing appropriate structuring,
disciplining and parenting models. (R, 178,
line 17 to R, 179, line 3)
The children should remain in their home.
(R, 197, lines 15-19).
Ms. Taft would not retreat from this position even when pressed
by the Court. (R, 180, lines 7-9).
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On the other hand, Ms. Taft's testimony relative to
Debra A. Tuckey was that Debra was more a friend or peer than
a parent (R, 177, lines 3-5) and

that there was concern about

direction, consistency (R, 177, lines 11-15); ability to
discipline (R, 178, lines 1-14) and maturity (R, 186, lines
10-17 and R, 189, lines 13-20).

Furthermore, inappropriate

aggressive behavior by the children occurred only in the presence
of their mother. (R, 187, lines 8-25).

There was also concern

for Defendant's ability to acquire parenting skills through
a social services program as suggested by Defendant's counsel
(R, 189, lines 8-20) and Ms. Taft unequivocally stated that

Defendant did not have appropriate parenting skills (R, 190,
lines 5-7).
VI.

CONCLUSION
Thus, it has been shown above that the trial court abused
its discretion in utilizing the wrong standard applicable to
this case.

Clearly, the weight of authority is in favor of the

"best interest of the child" approach as opposed to the "parental
right" doctrine.

The Utah cases cited herein are in accord with

that word of authority, and the trial court was bound to apply
that standard.
It is also clear that the trial court made Findings of Fact
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and Conclusions of Law that were inconsistent with the testimony
and other parts of the record, and requires that the trial court's
decision be reversed.
Finally, it is Intervenors' contention that upon the
weight of the evidence in the record, coupled with the application
of the correct standard, Intervenors are entitled to an order
of the Court granting permanent care, custody and control of
the minor children of Plaintiff and Defendant to them.
DATED this

J0

day of December, 1980.
ROBINSON, GUYON, Sill1MERHAYS & BARNES
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